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2The Irrelevance of Direction of Fit
The so-called ‘Humean’ view of motivation is pretty standard in the Philosophy of
Mind.  Its most prominent contemporary defender, Michael Smith, calls it a ‘dogma’.
Humeans believe in a strict divide between beliefs and desires.  Beliefs have no
intrinsic motivating force: I may believe anything at all, but only with the contribution
of a separate desire will I be motivated to act.  This claim should be broadened out to
include all cognitive states (belief, knowledge…).  The Humean claim is that
cognitive states are wholly lacking in conative power.  If some beliefs seem to us to
motivate action, that can only be due to a contingent association with a separate
conative state.
Humeans don’t deny that such contingent connections between belief and motivation
occur.  They’re very commonplace: if you were to acquire the belief that the building
you’re in is one fire, you’d immediately be motivated to do various things: to call the
fire service, to warn others, to leave the building.  Humeans are happy to accept
contingent connections between belief and motivation.  These connections may be
sufficiently powerful and immediate that it would be very difficult for an agent to
break the connection.  This poses no problem for the Humean, since they merely want
to insist that the belief is not necessarily linked to the motivation; that for an agent to
be motivated there must be a separate mental state present: a desire.
One way to argue on behalf of the Humeans is to appeal to the ‘direction of fit’ of
beliefs and desires1.  Both beliefs and desires may ‘fit’ the world, or not.  If I have a
false belief, my belief fails to fit the world.  If I have an unfulfilled desire, there is a
similar lack of fit.  Beliefs and desires differ, it is suggested, in the ‘direction’ in
which this ‘fitting’ relation operates.  If my belief is false, it is the belief that fails to
fit the world.  If my desire is unfulfilled, it is the world that fails to fit with my desire.
The argument is that:
1. Cognitive states have the first direction of fit.
2. Motivational states have the second direction of fit.
3. No single mental state could have both directions of fit.
4. So no cognitive state can be a motivational state.
Resistance to this argument tends to focus on the third of these premises.  Why we
may not conceive of mental states that are at once both cognitive and conative?  One
well-known attack on this premise is M.O. Little’s.  Her elegant argument relies on
the thought that a single mental state may have two contents, each with a different
direction of fit.2  My argument in this paper does not.  I will explain how it can be that
a mental state with a single propositional content can have both directions of fit,
something that Smith says is ‘just plain incoherent’3.The way in which Humeans
defend the premise differs depending on whether they wish to adopt a normative
notion of ‘direction of fit’, or a non-normative one.
                                                 
1 This argument can be found in Smith, 1994, 111-125
2 Little, 1997, 64
3 Smith, 1994, 118.
3In explaining the idea of direction of fit, it’s hard to avoid using normative terms4.
It’s natural to say that the cognitive states ought to fit the world, but that this is not
true of conative states (notice that it’s a lot less comfortable to say that the world
ought to fit conative states, since it is all too easy to think of desires that ought not to
be satisfied – this is, I suggest, a significant fact which I’ll be returning to).
Michael Smith is careful to avoid a normative construal of the distinction.  This is
because of the eventual purpose to which he wishes to put the Humean result, but that
needn’t bother us here.5  He instead characterises the distinction as ‘a difference in the
counterfactual dependence of a belief that p and a desire that p on a perception with
the content that not p: a belief that p tends to go out of existence in the presence of a
perception with the content that not p; whereas a desire that p tends to endure,
disposing the subject in that state to bring it about that p.’6
Smith’s non-normative version of the distinction doesn’t work, since it fails to capture
the intended difference.  There are examples of both cognitive and conative states that
fail to behave in the way that he describes.  Think of the belief that you’re going to
fall from a high place: it can persist even though you perceive the solidity of the
things holding you up.  Psychologists and psychiatrists have documented many cases
of delusional patients whose beliefs are resistant to correction7.  There are examples
of desires, too, which fail to persist as Smith says they tend to. ‘Adaptive preferences’
are desires that alter in the face of the perception that they will not be fulfilled.  For
example, Amartya Sen has reported on subjective perception of health in Indian men
and women.8  Indian women typically rated their health as better than the men, despite
the fact that they were no healthier from a third-person perspective. Sen suggests that
their level of contentment with relatively poor health is a product of their knowledge
that health care was less readily available to them than it was to the men.  Their
preferences have adapted to fit the realities of the situation: knowing that they will not
receive good health care, their desire for it goes out of existence.
It may be possible to defend Smith’s use of a non-normative notion of direction-of-fit
as a way of separating beliefs and desires.  For he says not that a belief will go out of
existence in the presence of the perception of contradictory evidence, but that ‘a belief
that p tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception with the content that
not p; whereas a desire that p tends to endure…’.9 Does this mean that my criticism of
his account mis-fires?
This perhaps depends on how we are to understand the words ‘tends to’.  Obviously
Smith cannot mean by this merely that usually beliefs behave in this way, but that
                                                 
4 See for instance Mark Platts’ well-known introduction of the term: ‘Beliefs aim at the true, and their
being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be
discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit with the world, not vice versa.  Desires aim at realization,
and their realization is the world fitting with them; the fact that the indicative content of a desire is not
realized in the world is not yet a failing in the desire, and not yet reason to discard the desire; the
world, crudely, should be changed to fit with our desires, not vice versa.’  Platts, 1979, 256-7
5 His reason, briefly, is that he wishes to employ these concepts in an analysis of normative judgement,
and thus cannot appeal to normative notions for fear of circularity.
6 Smith, 1994, 115
7 For excellent discussion see Bortolotti 2005, 192-198
8 Sen, quoted in Nussbaum, 2000, 139
9 Smith, 1994, 115.  Emphasis added.
4sometimes they do not, or that most beliefs have this tendency, but that some do not.
At least, he cannot mean this if we are to be able to take this as telling us what it is for
a given mental state to be a belief rather than something else.  Smith presents having
direction of fit, understood in this dispositional way, as being definitive of belief, as
capturing the essence of what it is to be a belief.  That being the case, he cannot allow
that some beliefs simply fail to have the feature in question.  That would mean that
there was something else that defined belief: some other criterion for being a belief.
If there was some other criterion, of course he could then claim that most beliefs go
out of existence in the face of contradictory perceptions.  But the claim would then
have lost its interest for us.
A better guess as to what Smith means is that each and every belief has a tendency,
i.e. a disposition, to go out of existence in the presence of a contradictory perception.
But just as other dispositions may sometimes fail to manifest themselves when
something interferes with the conditions that normally produce the characteristic
behaviour, so the disposition to go out of existence may be subject to interfering
conditions.  So, for example, sugar is soluble in water.  This means that it has a
disposition: to dissolve when immersed in water.  But if a particular sample of sugar
should fail to dissolve in water, that does not mean that it isn’t sugar – it means that
something interfered with the manifestation of its disposition to dissolve.  Perhaps the
water was already saturated with sugar, for example.  Likewise, although a particular
belief fails to go out of existence when I have a perception with contradictory content,
this does not necessarily mean that my belief lacked the relevant disposition.  It may
instead mean that in this case something prevents this disposition from being
manifested, even though it is present.  Thus Smith can still claim that each and every
belief has the relevant disposition.  That doesn’t commit him to saying that there are
no circumstances under which it fails to be manifested.
I don’t think that this response works for Smith.  There are examples of beliefs to
which we have no reason to ascribe the relevant tendency.  Suppose that I wish to
illustrate the Muller-Lyer illusion to my students.  I carefully draw on the board two
parallel lines of equal length, using a metre-stick.  I pause to check that they are the
same length, and that they look the same length.  Then I add the necessary lines at the
ends of the parallel lines.  Stepping back and looking again, the parallel lines now
seem to me to be different in length.  But I still believe that they are the same length.
My belief that they are the same length persists in existence despite the fact that I
have a perception that they are not the same length.  It’s the same for other visual
illusions.  If I look at a version of the ‘rotating snakes’ illusion, it seems to me that
some parts of the image are in motion in relation to other parts.  But I persist in my
belief that no part of the image is in motion.  It seems that my beliefs about those lines
and about that image, do not have the tendency Smith claims that all beliefs have.
So much for Smith’s attempt to cash out the notion of direction-of-fit in non-
normative terms.  But what of a normative account of direction-of-fit?  Isn’t such an
account made more plausible by the fact that all the counter-examples to Smith that
were just mentioned are examples of beliefs and desires that are in some way
defective (or, in the illusion cases, perceptions that are defective)?  This suggests that
even if we cannot say for all beliefs that they are states that will go out of existence in
the face of contrary perception, we can perhaps say that they are states that ought to
go out of existence in the face of contrary perception.  But even this is not true, as the
5case of visual illusions proves.  Take the illusion that straight lines on a background of
curved lines are themselves curved.  After measuring, I believe that they are straight,
and I ought to continue to believe this even though they continue to look curved.  This
suggests that beliefs ought to go out of existence only in the face of veridical contrary
perceptions, or in the face of contrary perceptions that we have no independent reason
to doubt.  This seems right to me, but it means nothing more than the familiar thought
that we should proportion our beliefs to the evidence.
Desires, on the other hand, are obviously not related to perceptions or to evidence like
this.  If I want to have cake, a perception that I do not have any doesn’t mean that I
ought to stop wanting some.  Does this mean that the Humean argument is successful?
I do not think so.  We have identified a difference between being-a-belief and being-
a-desire: established that these are distinct properties, but we have not yet shown that
it is impossible for a single mental state to share these properties. It may look as
though that is what has been shown, but only if we are careless.  We need to be clear
about what sorts of norms govern the two kinds of state.
For the Humean argument to work, the same sort of norm must apply on both sides of
the distinction.  For it is perfectly possible for a single state to exhibit both directions
of fit if that state’s reason to change and reason to remain unchanged are different
sorts of reason.  Here’s an example: I will give you a vast sum of money if you
believe that pixies are marching along the nearest wall.  This is an instance of the
familiar story in which some great reward will come to you if you can succeed in
believing that p (p being something that you do not at present believe and indeed have
evidence against).  Suppose that you succeed – what shall we say of your belief that
p?  It is a state that you have epistemic reason to change, but one which you have
prudential reason to maintain.  You both ought to change it and ought to keep it, but
this is no contradiction since these are two entirely different sorts of ‘ought’.
Recall a comment I made above: it doesn’t seem correct to say that a desire ought to
persist in the face of a perception that the desire is not currently satisfied.  Surely
discomfort with saying this is rooted in disquiet about the content of the desire.
Before we’re prepared to say whether it should persist, we want to know what it is a
desire for.  What desires a person ought to have is a matter of prudential and moral
norms, not epistemic ones.10  This means that there is no conflict between having the
two directions of fit: it is simply a product of beliefs and desires being governed by
different norms.  There’s no reason to think that a unitary state cannot be subject to
two different sets of norms that pull in different directions.
This means that there is no reason to accept premise three of the Humean’s
argument.11  To say that beliefs and desires have different directions of fit is to say no
more than that they are subject to different sorts of norms in different sorts of way.  In
                                                 
10 This ceases to be so if we consider the indirect application of norms.  So, epistemic norms may make
it valuable to want to know things, because such a desire serves epistemic goals.  Interestingly, this
reveals the way in which even a single kind of norm may pull in two ways: imagine a belief that it is
useful for an enquirer to have (i.e. it helps her to acquire knowledge) even though there is no evidence
for the belief, or even though it is in fact false.  In such a case, she has direct epistemic reason to lose
the belief, and indirect reason to keep it.
11 We can reject premise three without needing to make Little’s move of claiming that a single mental
state can have two contents, and thus two directions of fit.  I have shown that even a single content can
have two directions of fit, since a single content can be subject to more than one set of norms.
6typical cases, beliefs are subject to epistemic norms, and desires are subject to moral
and prudential norms.  That this is true is irrelevant to whether or not Humeanism
about motivation is true.
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